CERAGEM Deep Dive: The Korean Company That Sold Wellness by Giving It Away Free
CERAGEM's real invention was not the thermal massage bed but the café where you lie on one free with a coffee — 5.72 million people by 2024. A deep dive from its DART audit reports: revenue down 27% from the 2022 peak, and operating profit up from ₩2.2bn to ₩25.8bn in 2025.
Heat plus jade, the two ingredients of a CERAGEM bed, in a small far-infrared heating padAffiliate link. As an Amazon Associate, EpicKor earns from qualifying purchases at no extra cost to you.
Quick Answer
Search "thermal massage bed" in the United States and you will find a black reclining device called a CERAGEM, cleared by the FDA as a Class II medical device, priced on the company's own American store at $9,999 for the current Master V9. Almost nobody buying one can tell you what CERAGEM is or where it comes from.
CERAGEM Co., Ltd. (주식회사 세라젬) is a Korean company founded on 20 July 1998 and headquartered in Cheonan, about an hour south of Seoul. It is unlisted — at the end of 2025 founder Lee Hwan-sung owned 60.5% and the company held most of the rest as treasury shares — and as of October 2025 it sold in about 70 countries through some 2,500 stores. Its core products are spinal thermal devices and massage chairs.
But the device is not the interesting part of this company, and it is not what made it large.
CERAGEM's actual innovation was a retail format. In April 2019 it opened cafés — real cafés, with coffee — where you order a drink and then lie on a thermal massage bed as long as the session allows, no appointment, no salesperson hovering, no device purchase expected. By January 2024 those stores had put 5.72 million people onto the product. That is the company.
And here is the part a serious reader needs: the growth stopped. Consolidated revenue peaked at ₩750.2 billion in 2022, fell 27% to ₩546.0 billion in 2024, and was flat at ₩549.8 billion in 2025. Operating profit fell from ₩50.6 billion to just ₩2.2 billion before recovering to ₩25.8 billion in 2025, mostly by cutting costs. Those are audited figures from the company's own filings on DART, Korea's corporate disclosure system. This is a deep dive into a company that came down hard from a genuine peak and has just stopped falling, which is more instructive than another success story.
The Company at a Glance
| Detail | |
|---|---|
| Official name | CERAGEM Co., Ltd. (주식회사 세라젬) |
| Founded | 20 July 1998, under the name 삼성의료기산업 (Samsung Medical Instrument Industry) |
| Founder / Chairman | Lee Hwan-sung (이환성) — 60.5% of shares at end-2025; treasury shares 31.8%. In 2026 he gave 10% of issued shares to CEO Lee Kyung-soo, whom he adopted in 2025 |
| CEO | Lee Kyung-soo (이경수) |
| Headquarters | Cheonan, South Chungcheong |
| Listing status | Unlisted; a 2028 listing reported after CES in January 2026 is, per the company (June 2026), not an official target — timing and method undecided |
| Core products | Spinal thermal massage devices and massage chairs; the audited filings do not break revenue down by product |
| Markets | About 70 countries, about 2,500 stores worldwide (China ~1,200, India ~400) as of October 2025; 21 overseas subsidiaries at end-2025 |
| Retail format | Well Café → Well Lounge (웰라운지) — about 110 cafés converted in August 2026; a drink still buys a one-off session, regulars pay a monthly pass |
| Experience footfall | 5.72 million cumulative visitors by January 2024; about 7.5 million by mid-2026 (company figure) |
| Revenue peak | ₩750.2 billion (2022), consolidated |
| Recent revenue | ₩584.7bn (2023) · ₩546.0bn (2024) · ₩549.8bn (2025), consolidated |
| Operating profit | ₩50.6bn (2022) · ₩18.9bn (2023) · ₩2.2bn (2024) · ₩25.8bn (2025) |
| Overseas revenue | ₩231.7 billion in FY2025, down 5.4% — China ₩148.5bn (−16%), Southeast Asia & India ₩63.8bn (+22%) |
| US pricing | Master V9 $9,999 (sold out in all three colours) · Pause M10 massage chair $13,999 · MediSpa Pro $3,999 (company's own US store, 6 November 2026) |
Large jade and tourmaline heating pad — the cheap way to test this category A ten-thousand-dollar bed is not the entry point for most readers. Find out whether you actually like sustained heat on your back first; if you do, go and lie on the real thing before you buy it. CERAGEM's own devices are listed on Amazon but currently unavailable there. As an Amazon Associate, EpicKor earns from qualifying purchases at no extra cost to you.
See the jade heating pad on AmazonThe Origin Is a Hospital Bed
Founder Lee Hwan-sung built the company from an observation rather than a technology. In the late 1990s he looked at the powered medical beds used in Japanese hospitals and asked whether the underlying idea — a heated surface with rollers that travel the length of the spine — could be made as a consumer product for the home.
That framing has stayed with the company ever since, and it is why CERAGEM occupies an unusual category. It is not a furniture company that added heat, and it is not a massage-chair company. Its central product is a bed you lie on flat while a jade-tipped roller assembly moves along the spine under thermal heat, and the company positions it as a home healthcare device rather than a relaxation product. In the United States that positioning is formalised: CERAGEM's automatic thermal massagers are cleared by the FDA as Class II medical devices (product code JFB), with the first clearance in 2004 and the most recent, K250266, in July 2025. That is a regulatory classification, not a claim of efficacy.

The Real Product Was the Store
Here is the problem CERAGEM faced, and it is a genuinely hard one. It sells a large, expensive device whose entire value proposition is a physical sensation. You cannot describe the sensation in an advertisement. You cannot photograph it. Nobody is going to spend the equivalent of several thousand dollars on a machine they have never lain on.
The industry's traditional answer in Korea was door-to-door and demonstration selling — the salesperson brings the device to your home or invites you to a rented room. It works, and it also carries a reputation problem that clings to the whole category: pressure, elderly customers, and the general atmosphere of a sales pitch you cannot leave politely.
CERAGEM's answer was to invert it. In April 2019 it opened the first Well Café (웰카페): a genuine café where the thermal massage beds and massage chairs sit in the back, and ordering a drink is the only price of a session on them. No appointment. Have a coffee. Lie down. Leave. Nobody asks you to buy the device.
By January 2024, with about 135 cafés running, 5.72 million people had experienced the product that way. In July 2026 a company spokesperson put the cumulative figure at about 7.5 million.
The format is working as a sales funnel, and the company's own numbers say so. In CERAGEM's own May 2026 survey of 1,292 Master V buyers, 69.3% had tried the device in a Well Café, Well Lounge or department-store counter before buying, and the average across all 1,292 respondents was 4.5 tries before purchase.
Then, in August 2026, CERAGEM changed the deal. It converted its roughly 110 Well Cafés into Well Lounges (웰라운지), a membership format: a drink still buys a single session, but regular use now runs through a "wellness pass" at ₩50,000 a month, good for up to three visits a week and two devices a visit, with staff coaches running programmes for spine, circulation, exercise and beauty. Pass usage in the first half of 2026 was up about 90% on a year earlier, according to the company. The free café that built the brand is turning into a paid gym for lying down.
Read as a retail decision, this is elegant. It solves the demonstration problem without the demonstration pressure, it converts a distribution cost into a brand asset, and it turns the thing that made the category distrusted — you have to try it — into the reason to visit. For an overseas operator studying Korean consumer companies, this is the transferable idea in the entire company, and it has nothing to do with heat or rollers.
Then the Numbers Went the Other Way
Between 2022 and 2024 the company lost more than a quarter of its revenue and almost all of its operating profit. In 2025 the fall stopped.
| Year | Revenue (consolidated) | Operating profit | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | ₩750.2bn | ₩50.6bn | peak revenue |
| 2023 | ₩584.7bn | ₩18.9bn | revenue down 22% |
| 2024 | ₩546.0bn | ₩2.2bn | net loss ₩12.6bn |
| 2025 | ₩549.8bn | ₩25.8bn | revenue +0.7%; net profit ₩1.9bn |
Source: CERAGEM's audited consolidated financial statements on DART, FY2023 report (filed 12 April 2024) for 2022–2023 and FY2025 report (filed 13 April 2026) for 2024–2025.
Korean coverage attributes the 2022–2024 decline to conditions rather than a single mistake: the end of the pandemic period, inflation, higher interest rates and weakened consumer sentiment. A ₩10 million device in the home is exactly the purchase a household defers when rates rise, and CERAGEM had grown through a period when people were at home with money they were not spending on travel.
The 2025 recovery came from the cost line, not the sales line. Revenue grew by less than 1%. Selling and administrative costs fell from ₩324.1 billion to ₩302.5 billion, and within them salaries fell 23.5% (₩77.5 billion to ₩59.3 billion) and advertising 12.8% (₩23.2 billion to ₩20.3 billion). Cash fell from ₩218.4 billion to ₩130.5 billion over the year as the company paid down borrowings. A company that cuts its way back to profit has bought time, not growth.
There is a second set of books worth knowing about. CERAGEM's parent company on its own — the Korean business, without the overseas subsidiaries — reports separately, and it is weaker: ₩381.2 billion of revenue in 2025 with an operating loss of ₩3.2 billion, down from a loss of ₩40.3 billion in 2024. Some coverage quotes these parent-only figures next to the group's peak, which makes the decline look like a halving. The first version of this article made exactly that mistake. It was not a halving; the like-for-like fall from peak is 27%.
Two structural facts make the decline harder to reverse.
The concentration. The business is built on two products: the spinal thermal device and the massage chair. The company has been visibly trying to broaden into a general home appliance and wellness business — its "7-Care" line-up now includes an incontinence device, a beauty device and a depression-improvement device — but the audited filings do not break revenue down by product, so there is no public number showing how much of the business sits outside the two core lines. Diversification has been attempted; there is no public evidence it has arrived.
The shift abroad has reversed. In 2024, overseas was the bright spot: ₩244.8 billion, up 32.7%, with China up 36.4%. In 2025 it went the other way. By the audit report's regional segments, overseas revenue fell 5.4% to ₩231.7 billion, because China dropped 16% to ₩148.5 billion. Korea, meanwhile, rose 5.6% to ₩318.1 billion. The 2025 recovery was a domestic one.
The real growth is now in smaller markets. Southeast Asia and India grew 22% to ₩63.8 billion and Latin America 47% to ₩12.8 billion. India alone has about 400 stores and its subsidiary sold ₩42.7 billion in 2025. In Vietnam, where CERAGEM has sold since 2008, it runs 81 experience stores, and its local subsidiary head told Money Today in October 2026 that about 20% of visitors who try a device go on to buy one.

The Honest Risks
This is a company that shrank, and the article should not pretend otherwise. Consolidated revenue is down 27% from the 2022 peak and operating profit, even after the 2025 recovery, is half what it was in 2022. The Korean parent on its own still lost money at the operating line in 2025. Any partner, distributor or supplier evaluating CERAGEM should build their model on the 2024–2025 figures rather than the peak-year numbers that still circulate in older coverage.
The category has a reputation problem, and it is not imaginary. Thermal massage devices and massage chairs are sold in many markets through demonstration, home visits and referral networks, and the sector has attracted regulatory and press attention accordingly — particularly around elderly customers and health claims. CERAGEM's café format is a deliberate move away from that model, and it deserves credit for it, but the category context follows the product across borders. A Western buyer encountering the brand for the first time should evaluate it on the FDA classification and the physical product, not on wellness language.
It is unlisted, so the paper trail is thinner — but not absent. CERAGEM files no quarterly reports or business reports of the kind a KOSPI or KOSDAQ company must produce, so there is no public half-year number and no management commentary. It is, however, large enough to fall under Korea's external-audit law, so its audited annual statements, consolidated and parent-only, are public on DART every April. The financial figures in this article come from those filings. What they do not contain — revenue by product line, store economics, conversion rates — still has to come from the company or from press estimates, and anyone doing real diligence should ask for it directly.
Diversification is unproven. The company has invested outside its core — in 2024 it put ₩23.4 billion into Ybrain (와이브레인), an electroceutical device maker, and held 41.1% of it at end-2025 — and has restructured its retail formats. After CERAGEM's ₩2.8 billion share of Ybrain's 2025 loss, the stake was carried at ₩25.3 billion. There is no public evidence yet that any of it has changed what the company sells.
What Overseas Operators Can Take From This
When the product cannot be advertised, the store is the advertisement. CERAGEM's café is the sharpest example in Korean retail of solving a demonstration problem structurally. Any company selling something that must be felt — mattresses, chairs, audio, wellness devices — should study the format rather than the device.
Free trial at scale is a distribution cost, and it should be measured as one. 5.72 million experiences in under five years is a marketing number that most companies would report as reach. For CERAGEM it is closer to a sales funnel with a physical footprint: buyers lie on the device 4.5 times on average before paying for it. The interesting question is what that costs per conversion. That figure is not public — and the August 2026 move to a ₩50,000 monthly pass suggests the company no longer wants to give unlimited sessions away at the old scale.
Split domestic from overseas before forming a view, every year. In 2024 overseas revenue grew 32.7% while the group shrank; in 2025 the pattern flipped, with Korea up 5.6% and overseas down 5.4% on a 16% fall in China. A single headline revenue number hid both moves. If you are assessing a Korean consumer-durables company, read the segment note in the audit report, not the press release.
The subsidiary list is information. CERAGEM's audit report lists 21 overseas subsidiaries at both end-2024 and end-2025, from Germany and Romania to Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, while the Africa segment reported no segment revenue in either year. Companies rarely announce retreats as retreats. Read the subsidiary table, not press-release adjectives.
What to Watch Next
Whether non-core lines show up in the numbers. Everything the company says about its future depends on products beyond the spinal device and the chair growing. The audited filings do not split revenue by product, so for now the only evidence is the company's own word.
Whether China stabilises. China was ₩148.5 billion of a ₩231.7 billion overseas business in 2025 and fell 16%. Southeast Asia, India and Latin America grew fast but from a small base. The FY2026 audit report, due on DART around April 2027, will show whether the smaller markets can carry the overseas line.
Whether the Well Lounge conversion changes anything. Converting about 110 cafés into a paid, programme-led format is a bet that the experience needs to be deeper rather than merely free. The result will show up in conversion and in Korean segment revenue, not footfall.
Whether a listing happens at all. A 2028 IPO was widely reported after the CEO's remarks at CES in January 2026, but in June 2026 the company said 2028 was a Q&A remark that had been over-interpreted, not an official target, and that the timing and method of any IPO are undecided. Earlier listing plans in 2008, 2017 and around 2021 and 2024 were all shelved. Meanwhile succession has started: the chairman adopted CEO Lee Kyung-soo in 2025 and gave him 10% of the issued shares in 2026. An IPO would force quarterly disclosure — the thing this article most lacks.
FAQ About CERAGEM
Q: Is CERAGEM a Korean company?
A: Yes. CERAGEM Co., Ltd. was founded on 20 July 1998 and is headquartered in Cheonan, South Chungcheong Province, Korea. It is unlisted and was founded by Chairman Lee Hwan-sung, who owned 60.5% of its shares at the end of 2025, with Lee Kyung-soo as chief executive. It sells in about 70 countries and listed 21 overseas subsidiaries in its FY2025 audit report.
Q: What does CERAGEM actually make?
A: Its core products are spinal thermal massage devices — the reclining bed with a heated roller assembly that travels along the spine — and massage chairs. It also sells other home wellness devices, including incontinence, beauty and depression-improvement devices, which it has been trying to grow. Its audited filings do not break revenue down by product.
Q: What is a CERAGEM Well Café?
A: A company-operated café in Korea where ordering a drink let visitors use a thermal massage bed or massage chair, without an appointment or an obligation to buy the device. The first opened in April 2019, and 5.72 million people had used the format by January 2024. In August 2026 CERAGEM converted its roughly 110 Well Cafés into Well Lounges: a drink still buys one session, while regular use runs through a ₩50,000-a-month wellness pass of up to three visits a week.
Q: How much does a CERAGEM cost?
A: On the company's own US store on 6 November 2026, the Master V9 thermal massage bed was listed at $9,999 (sold out in all three colours that day), the Pause M10 massage chair at $13,999, and the MediSpa Pro at $3,999, with a refurbished Master V4 listed at $3,299. Prices vary by market and change; treat these as a reference point rather than a quote.
Q: Is CERAGEM financially healthy?
A: Weaker than at its peak, but no longer falling. Consolidated revenue peaked at ₩750.2 billion in 2022, fell to ₩546.0 billion in 2024, and was ₩549.8 billion in 2025, when operating profit recovered from ₩2.2 billion to ₩25.8 billion, largely through cost cuts. The Korean parent on its own still had a ₩3.2 billion operating loss in 2025, and overseas revenue fell 5.4% as China declined. The audited statements are public on DART; anyone doing commercial diligence should still ask the company for product-level figures.
Q: Is the device FDA approved?
A: It is FDA cleared as a Class II medical device in the United States — CERAGEM's automatic thermal massagers have a series of 510(k) clearances, the latest (K250266) dated July 2025. Clearance is a regulatory classification indicating the device is substantially equivalent to an existing marketed device. That is not the same as FDA approval of a health claim, and it should not be read as one.
Related Reading
- Glasslock Deep Dive: The Korean Company Behind the Glass Container in Your Costco Cart — another Korean maker whose product is known and whose name is not.
- Winix Deep Dive: America's Favorite Budget Air Purifier Is a 50-Year-Old Korean Company — the same anonymity pattern in home appliances.
- Cuckoo Deep Dive: The Korean Rice Cooker That Outlived LG, Its Own Client — a Korean home-appliance maker that solved a different distribution problem.
- How to Find Suppliers in Korea — the practical starting point for sourcing from Korean manufacturers.
- Korean Jjimjilbang Guide: Sauna Etiquette and Tips — the Korean bathhouse culture that makes a heated-bed product feel ordinary at home.
Last Updated: 6 November 2026. Financial, ownership, subsidiary and segment figures come from CERAGEM's audited consolidated and parent-only financial statements on DART — the latest available is the FY2025 audit report, filed 13 April 2026; 2022–2023 figures are from the FY2023 report filed 12 April 2024. There is no public half-year figure for 2026 because the company is unlisted. Store counts, visitor numbers, the buyer survey and the Well Lounge pass come from the company via Korean press (Smart Today, January and April 2024; Aju Business Daily, October 2025; Newsis, May 2026; Digital Daily, July 2026; Segye Ilbo, August 2026; Money Today, September and October 2026). The IPO position is from MTN (16 June 2026); the adoption and share gift from CEO Score Daily (20 October 2026). FDA clearances are from the FDA 510(k) database. US prices were read from the company's own American online store on 6 November 2026 and change without notice. EpicKor has no commercial relationship with CERAGEM. Nothing in this article is medical advice.
More Business Guides

Kovea Deep Dive: The Korean Burner Maker That Took Apart a Swedish Stove — and Now Builds for MSR
Look at the box your Snow Peak LiteMax came in and it says Made in Korea. Kovea started in 1982 when its late founder took apart a Swedish SVEA burner, now supplies MSR and Decathlon, and still earned a 21% operating margin after Korea's camping market halved.

Mooto Deep Dive: Korea Still Dresses Taekwondo — Spain Makes the Part That Scores the Points
World Taekwondo recognises Mooto in six equipment categories. The two it is absent from are the electronic ones — and the scoring system at Tokyo 2020 and Paris 2024 came from Barcelona. A look at the Korean company that dresses the sport Korea exported.

Aurora World: The Korean Company Behind Aurora Plush — Corporation vs Inc., Owners and 2026 Results
Aurora World Corporation (오로라월드) is a KOSDAQ-listed Seoul company; Aurora World, Inc. is its US arm. Q3 2026 filing: nine-month operating profit ₩45.8bn, already above all of 2025, on ₩297.8bn revenue, with ₩343bn of debt.